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Abstract 
 
To many people love is special, sacred even. Love plays a countless number of roles for a 
countless number of people. Contemporary ideas about love, however, are more in 
alignment with the philosophies of Aristotle, and not of Plato. Aristotle held that love 
could exist as many people see it today – wishing well for others purely for their own 
sake. But Plato disagreed. Plato claimed that love was a way by which one could better 
themselves and become wiser. In this thesis, I explain Plato’s theory of love put forth in 
the Symposium. I also explore the textual evidence for the selfish nature of Plato’s love. 
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Introduction 
Gregory Vlastos, in an objection to Plato’s theory of love, offered the following 
praise for Socrates’ disciple: “Plato is the first Western man to realize how intense and 
passionate may be our attachment to objects as abstract as social reform, poetry, art, the 
sciences, and philosophy – an attachment that has more in common with erotic fixation 
that one would have suspected on a pre-Freudian view of man.” (Vlastos 1981, 27) There 
are a couple of things about Vlastos’ comment worth noting: For one, only a special 
breed of respect impels objectors to credit their opponents with such insight – precisely 
the type of respect that Plato commands. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, 
Vlastos hints at both the notion of attachment and eroticism that are central to Plato’s 
theory of Love. 
Before going further, it is essential to recognize that Love is an extraordinarily 
expansive term. In the English language, Love can be taken in a romantic context or in a 
familial or friendly context; it can be taken to be erotic or devoid of sexuality; it can be in 
reference to hatred (i.e. “loving to hate” something); ultimately it can be described as a 
strong sense of affection or admiration for something, erotic or not (although Plato’s use 
of the term is saturated with eroticism). Love’s expansiveness in English, however, pales 
in comparison to its Greek predecessor Eros. Eros, best defined as an erotic longing for 
sexual attraction and gratification, is an even more comprehensive term than Love, which 
would partly explain the wide spectrum across which Plato’s Love operates. As broad a 
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term as Love is in English, Eros occupied an even larger linguistic space in Greek. As 
such, in spite of the breadth of Love’s applicability, there is something lost in translation 
from Eros to Love. In spite of its slight inaccuracies, Love is simply the translation best 
suited to do justice to Eros. As Vlastos says, “’Love’ is the only English word that is 
robust and versatile enough to cover [eros].” (Vlastos 1981, 4) 
For this paper’s purpose, it is Love – and Plato’s take on it – that is concerned. Of 
the many dialogues for which he is responsible, The Symposium is devoted chiefly to 
Love. Depicting a party, of sorts, at which numerous historical figures are placed, love – 
both the God and the idea (eros) – is discussed at length and from numerous perspectives. 
Each present member puts forth a story about love intended to convey to the others his 
particular argument for its purpose and its importance. The Symposium will be the focus 
of this paper in evaluating Plato’s arguments regarding love. 
It is right, at this moment, to draw attention to what John M. Cooper notes in the 
introduction to Plato: Complete Works: “it is in the writing as a whole that the author 
speaks, not in the words of any single speaker…” (Cooper 1997, xx) What Cooper 
intends to convey to his reader, and what I hope my reader will note as well, is that 
Plato’s ultimate message is contained not in one character’s words but in the entirety of 
the dialogue. Effectively, Plato trusts the reader to decipher what it is that he means. 
What has been noted by academia, and by Patrick Miller of The University of 
North Carolina in particular, is that Plato’s Symposium is devoid of the traditional 
argumentative interaction between characters that is fundamental in many of his other 
dialogues. (Miller 2000) Instead, Miller argues, The Symposium is what he calls a 
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“synthetic” argument: one which can be gleaned from drawing fragments of information 
from several sources and synthesizing them into a final, comprehensive position. (Miller 
2000) 
In what follows, I will argue for the claim that Plato’s Love is a selfish brand of 
Love; a spirit infused not with the benevolence and other-caring essence of contemporary 
Love, but rather a force rooted in self-actualization that propels personal ambition. 
A caveat, however, before I continue: selfish in colloquial terms tends to take on a 
negative connotation, a sense that the act at hand is done not only without concern for 
others but with the knowledge that such an act would deprive others of a certain type of 
pleasure or disrupt their well-being. That is not the sense in which I mean to use the word 
selfish. I wish only to draw on the literal meaning of the word and to expel the negative 
connotation that often accompanies it. Each time I use the word selfish going forward, it 
should be taken only to mean done exclusively out of self-interest, but not simultaneously 
to detract from anyone else’s well-being. 
This thesis will be structured using two sections. Section One will present Plato’s 
argument for love and its purpose. Section Two will use the understanding developed in 
Section One to explain my analysis of Plato’s theory of love as selfish. 
Plato’s version of Love may strike many as incompatible with the form of Love 
most popular in today’s society. Aristotle’s idea of Love – that to love a person we must 
wish for that person’s good for that person’s sake, not for ours – may fit much more 
nicely within the framework of the contemporary idea of Love. (Vlastos 1981, 6) But 
exploring ideas that challenge the status quo and force to mind thoughts about important 
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themes is usually a productive exercise, and one that can further inform opinions 
regarding the most important questions in life. Because often the most important 
questions – for instance, what is love? – refuse to be answered, and developing an 
informed opinion is the only adequate alternative. 
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Section One 
Before it is possible to recognize Plato’s theory of love as selfish, it is necessary 
to develop a comprehensive understanding of the argument that he makes in the 
Symposium. As was addressed in the introduction, Plato’s use of dialogue is unique in 
that his message is woven within the voices of numerous characters and not exclusively a 
primary protagonist. Accordingly, the reader is often charged with the responsibility of 
identifying relevant themes and collecting them such that a coherent claim may be made. 
To begin, I will outline Plato’s theory of love in its entirety. In doing so, I will 
highlight the relevance of important aspects in each solitary character’s speeches. Such 
an exercise is fruitful because each character in the Symposium describes a part of love 
that Plato holds as important; the problem is that the individual speeches do not do justice 
to Plato’s theory as a whole. Each of the characters claim that their particular praise of 
Love is right, but Plato intends for his theory to be more robust than what the individuals 
offer. As Patrick Miller of the University of North Carolina argues, “[e]ach [character] 
commits the mereological fallacy…each has described a part quite accurately, but erred 
insofar as he took that description to apply to Love as a whole.” (Miller 2000, 12) Only in 
aggregate do the ideas about love in the individual characters’ speeches combine to 
produce the complete Platonic theory on love. 
Socrates’ speech – although it might rightly be said to be Diotima’s – will be paid 
more attention to because his is a synthesis of those who came before. (Miller 2000, 16) 
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Miller writes that Socrates is in a position to expound upon the theories of those 
who came before him because he is ultimately the one who recognizes both the 
limitations of his colleagues’ accounts as well as how their accounts mesh together. 
(Miller 2000, 12) What follows is my interpretation of Plato’s account regarding Love.  
To Plato, love is a force compelling lovers – guiding them, even – to seek 
something. Guidance is one of the overarching themes apparent in the dialogue, and 
several speakers in the Symposium make clear the guiding nature of Love: “[We will find 
wholeness] if Love is our guide and our commander,” says Aristophanes; (Plato 1997, 
476) “There is a certain guidance each person needs for his whole life,” says Phaedrus, 
“if he is to live well; and nothing imparts this guidance…as well as Love;” (Plato 1997, 
463) “Medicine, therefore, is guided everywhere by the god of Love,” says even 
Eryximachus, who plays a minor role in the Symposium. (Plato 1997, 470) The 
prevalence of Love acting as a guiding force would suggest that it guides towards 
goodness – or at least something worth being guided towards. 
But Love, oddly, is understood to be neither good nor bad; neither beautiful nor 
ugly. Pausanius introduces this idea when he relates his view to the others in attendance 
that he believes nothing to be inherently good or bad but instead dependent on the 
resulting behavior. “Considered in itself,” he says, “no action is either good or bad, 
honorable or shameful…and my point is that exactly this principle applies to being in 
love.” (Plato 1997, 465) This teleological take on Love seems odd, because the dialogue 
is centered on praising Love. Praise is usually reserved for that which people deem to be 
praise-worthy, an implication that the topic is good. Diotima, however, corroborates 
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Pausanius’ insight. She, too, claims that Love is an intermediary and not definitively one 
thing or another. She insists that just as Love is neither good nor bad, neither, even, is it a 
proper god or definitively mortal. “He’s a great spirit, Socrates,” claims Diotima, 
“everything spiritual, you see, is in between god and mortal.” (Plato 1997, 485) Love is 
the bonding element that links the two definitive sides between which it exists, which 
becomes evident as Socrates relays Diotima’s wisdom regarding spirits: “Being in the 
middle of [gods and men], they round out the whole and bind fast the all to all.” (Plato 
1997, 486) Love operates in a bizarre gray area that is the reason for, in large part, its 
power and its energy. Ultimately, Plato’s love is a catalyst, of sorts. 
Given its binding nature, however, Love has an attractive quality – it draws lovers 
to whatever it is that they seek. But what is it that lovers seek? At the beginning of his 
speech, Socrates asks Agathon, “[i]s Love the love of nothing or of something?” (Plato 
1997, 482) The query is intended to establish something about the nature of Love, to 
establish whether or not there is something to be sought after for which Love would be 
useful. Soon thereafter, the two agree that love is, in fact, the love of something – that 
there exists an object of love.1 Interestingly, Plato suggests that the object of love 
changes as one gets more acquainted with it. The object of love is not constant until one 
has identified – and subsequently taken part in – the ultimate goal: Beauty itself. The 
ultimate goal of Platonic Love is to encourage individuals to seek the Form of Beauty, 
but such an end is one that requires careful refinement and keen awareness – two 
1 Gregory Vlastos provides what is often referenced as the most coherent objection to Plato’s theory of love 
in the form of an essay titled The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato. His essay will be looked to 
numerous times in this thesis, both to provide guidance and to provide interpretation with which to 
disagree. 
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qualities that, frankly, not everyone possesses.2 As such, realizing the pinnacle of 
Platonic Love is a process, and one that occurs in stages. Only extraordinary individuals – 
individuals consumed with curiosity and desirous of wisdom – will take part in the 
highest form of Platonic Love. Others will be incapable of ascending to the next stage 
and will instead remain arrested at a subordinate stage of love – one whose object is 
inferior to that of Beauty itself. 
But what of the objects of Love? An accurate synopsis of their evolution is given 
by Luce Irigaray and Eleanor H. Kuykendall: “From the attraction to a single beautiful 
body (the lover) passes, then, to many; and thence to the beauty residing in souls. Thus he 
learns that beauty is not found univocally in the body and that someone of an ugly bodily 
appearance can be beautiful and gentle of soul; that to be just is to know how to care for 
that person and to engender beautiful discourses for him. Love thus passes insensibly into 
love of works [oeuvres]. The passion for beautiful bodies is transmuted into the discovery 
of beauty in knowledge.” (Irigaray and Kuykendall 1989) 
As Irigaray and Kuykendall note, the first object of love, the object of young, 
unrefined love according to Plato, is a beautiful body. It is by recognizing that beauty 
exists in a body that one is to appreciate many bodies – beautiful bodies in general. Going 
from one to many is the first step in generalizing Love. It is important to note that in this 
2 It is interesting to note that Plato’s take on love is – at least partially – elitist. Pausanius, who captures 
nicely, if crudely, the hierarchical aspect of the author’s perspective on love, says “it is the common, vulgar 
lover, who loves the body rather than the soul, the man whose love is bound to be inconstant, since what he 
loves is itself mutable and unstable…How different from this is a man who loves the right sort of character, 
and who remains its lover for life…” (Symposium, p. 468, 183e) Merely by acknowledging the existence of 
those who are sick with “vulgar love” implies that not everyone achieves the end towards which Love 
strives. The value judgment placed on “vulgar love” is aggressively negative, and one that permeates the 
Symposium in almost every member’s speech. As such, it appears that Plato willingly excludes some people 
from experiencing the pinnacle of what his love has to offer. 
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pre-mature stage of Love, what is to be appreciated is the physical beauty. Plato’s Love 
allows for, indeed it requires, a submission to the instinct most people have of attraction 
to a certain physique – the caveat is that such an impulse, by Plato’s standards, is 
eventually to be superseded by a less tangible, more permanent Love of the soul. 
Ultimately, Love’s aim is to inspire those within whom it operates to pursue the purest 
and most general iteration of beauty – the Form of Beauty. In order to do so lovers must 
begin with the basics. 
According to Plato, however, bodily, aesthetic beauty is an immature and 
subordinate level of Love at which to remain. It is a necessary stepping stone from which 
one can move to yet a higher object of Love, but those who remain infatuated with bodily 
beauty are just that – infatuated – and have not realized the essence of Love and its 
purpose. 
Consider how Pausanius describes Love, as a whole composed of two parts: 
“common,” and “heavenly” love. (Plato 1997, 465) The point at which Love’s object is 
beautiful bodies, at which a person is attracted to physical beauty and nothing more, is 
categorized by Pausanius as “common” Love. (Plato 1997, 465) Of common Love 
Pausanius says, “[t]his, of course, is the love felt by the vulgar, who are attached to 
women no less than to boys, to the body more than to the soul, and to the least intelligent 
partners, since all they care about is completing the sexual act.” (Plato 1997, 465-466) 
Critiquing tone is difficult when dealing with translations, but the use of the word 
“vulgar” and the phrase “all they care about is completing the sexual act” give the sense 
that a Love whose object is physical beauty is an inferior and incomplete brand of Love. 
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From “vulgar” it seems as though those who appreciate only bodily beauty are disgusting 
or vile, and that merely “completing the sexual act” is a profound misappropriation of 
Love’s purpose. “These vulgar lovers,” says Pausanius, “are the people who have given 
love such a bad reputation…” (Plato 1997, 466) Pausanius goes almost so far as to 
suggest that “vulgar” Love acts more as a disease that infects persons rather than guides 
them towards true Beauty.3 
Heavenly love, by contrast, is “considerably older and therefore free of the 
lewdness of youth,” and is intended to represent the love that manifests itself in an 
attraction to what is “stronger and more intelligent.” (Plato 1997, 466)4 “How different 
from [“common” Love],” says Pausanius, “who loves the right sort of character, and who 
remains its lover for life…” (Plato 1997, 468) He also lauds Love’s capacity to facilitate 
the acquisition and development of virtue: 
“It follows, therefore, that giving in to your lover for virtue’s 
sake is honorable, whatever the outcome. And this, of course, 
is the Heavenly Love of the heavenly goddess. Love’s value to 
the city as a whole and to the citizens is immeasurable, for he 
compels the lover and loved one alike to make virtue their 
3 Here Pausanius’ claim that “considered in itself, no action is either good or bad, honorable or 
shameful…and my point is that exactly this principle applies to being in love,” (Plato 1997, 465) becomes 
more meaningful. Far from being inherently good, misappropriated Love can beget vulgarity and an 
attitude that is worthy of scorn. Love has both the potential to guide lovers in the direction of greatness or 
to ground lovers in an obsession with pedestrian physical beauty. 
4 This is the first explicit mention of the superiority of homosexual relationships to heterosexual ones. As 
Plato’s theory is expounded upon it becomes clearer why exclusively male relationships are regarded as 
better than relationships between males and females, but Luce Irigaray provides a clear explanation of the 
phenomenon that will be of use going forward. “Love becomes…wisdom...the more its objective is 
distanced from an individual becoming, the more valuable it is…this, moreover, is how it comes to pass 
that love between men is superior to love between man and woman. Carnal procreation is suspended in 
favor of the engendering of beautiful and good things. Immortal things.” In more explicit and clearer terms 
than Pausanius, Irigaray sheds light on the fact that because the physical beauty of bodies is regarded as 
less important and intellectual prowess is regarded as more important, men are to seek other men because 
they are to seek wisdom, and men are the wisest beings – barring gods – in existence. (Irigaray and 
Kuykendall 1989) 
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central concern. All other forms of love belong to the vulgar 
goddess.” (Plato 1997, 469) 
 
Here Pausanius makes it clear that begetting virtue is, in his mind, Love’s highest 
purpose. Only when Love “compels the lover and loved one alike to make virtue their 
central concern” is Love being properly applied; anything else is an instance of vulgarity. 
Thus it come to be that virtue, in some form, is Love’s next object. It becomes clear that 
the transition must be made from appreciating physical beauty to recognizing that there is 
more to Love. 
For the extrapolation of Love’s next object, virtue, we must now turn to the 
speeches of Agathon and Socrates.  The first mention of the ethereal nature of Love’s 
higher objects comes in Agathon’s speech: “[Love] makes his home in the characters, in 
the souls, of Gods and men…” (Plato 1997, 478) Here Agathon makes it clear that Love 
is linked to the souls of humans. Previously, it was made known that there exists a Love 
hierarchy, a “scala amoris” as Vlastos calls it, but with his speech Agathon cements 
Love’s soulful character. (Vlastos 1981) Given the importance that Plato places on the 
soul – and perhaps most importantly the immortality that he awards the soul – placing 
Love in the soul’s capable hands is a definitive sign that Love’s higher aims are of great 
importance. (Prince 2011) 
But Agathon notes that soulful Love (Love whose object is something more 
permanent than the body) is not immediately available to everyone. He says that “when 
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[Love] encounters a soul with a harsh character, he turns it away,” meaning that Love 
discriminates against those who are not fit for Love. (Plato 1997, 478)5 
At this point, it is right to look to Socrates for more color. His recollection of his 
dialogue with Diotima will shed light on the ultimate (highest) object of Love. The two 
banter for a bit before coming to the understanding that when a lover of good things 
comes to possess the things she desires, it follows that she is happy. “The main point is 
this,” says Diotima, “every desire for good things or for happiness is the ‘supreme and 
treacherous love’ in everyone…That’s because what everyone loves is really nothing 
other than the good.” (Plato 1997, 488-489) At long last the highest object of Love is 
made clear: 
“In a word, then, Love is wanting to possess the good forever…This, 
then, is the object of Love.” (Plato 1997, 489) 
 
This final stage in the scala amoris is a synergy of two understandings. For one, it 
is the understanding that what people truly desire is the good. Everything that people 
desire is a manifestation of the good. Secondly, those who desire the good desire to 
possess it for as long as possible – they desire to have it forever. 
The question thus becomes how does one go about acquiring the good forever? 
Diotima replies with an admittedly bizarre answer. By “giving birth in beauty,” responds 
5 Again, this is an instance of Plato’s Love being elitist. It is clear that Plato makes room in his theory for 
certain people to remain arrested at a subordinate level of Love, and he also appears here to allow for 
people to possess a pre-disposition that renders them incapable of loving. Perhaps the two are akin to one 
another, or multiple forms of the same idea. Regardless, it is plain that Plato’s Love is discriminatory: there 
are people for whom Love is impossible. It is also implied that those who remain stuck on lower “levels” of 
Love are subordinate to those who partake in higher ones. As such, it follows that those who do not Love at 
all are the worst off. 
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Diotima. (Plato 1997, 489) Behind the odd, cryptic answer lays a simpler, more easily 
understood notion. How does one achieve the good forever? By producing beauty such 
that one is immortalized for it. “Giving birth” or “begetting” is Plato’s word for 
reproduction. Love is the force by which individuals are compelled to behave in ways 
that produce immortality. 
Is not, however, immortality impossible? Surely Plato has wisdom enough to 
know as much. Immortality, though, is in alignment with the rest of his theory. Just as 
bodily beauty is a subordinate form of beauty in Plato’s eyes, so it is with bodily 
immortality. Plato’s immortality is meant in the sense that one’s legacy is made such that 
it is not forgotten.  
Given that individuals desire the good, and that beauty is good, “giving birth in 
beauty” – doing beautiful things that ensure one’s legacy is remembered – is the key to 
being in Love. Procreation in the literal sense is one instance of immortality. One’s 
essence is preserved and passed along, together with a partner’s, in the form of a child. 
But again, the intangible elements of humanity are always, for Plato, superior to the 
tangible, aesthetic ones. Diotima reveals to Socrates, “[e]veryone would rather have such 
children than human ones, and would look up to Homer, Hesiod, and the other good poets 
with envy and admiration for the offspring they have left behind – offspring, which, 
because they are immortal themselves, provide their parents with  immortal glory and 
remembrance.” (Plato 1997, 492) 
 Ultimately, Love for Plato is a means by which to become wiser, to become more 
virtuous – to become more Form-like. That the pursuit of betterment is riddled with 
13 
 
impediments, Plato grants, but he maintains that anything less than recognition of – and 
subsequent birth in – true beauty is falling short of Love’s potential. 
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Section Two 
L.A. Kosman, in his essay titled Platonic Love, mentions that one of the primary 
objections to Plato’s theory of Love is that it is too selfish and egoistical to account for 
the love that is clearly present between people. (Kosman 1976, 54) “Love on Plato’s 
theory,” Kosman says, “is basically egoistical and selfish. A person cannot, according to 
Plato, love or desire another for the sake of that other, i.e. for the other’s good, but only 
for his own sake, that is, for whatever good that other might provide him.” (Kosman 
1976, 54)6 In what ways, though, is Plato’s Love selfish? 
There are two fundamental pillars involved in the selfishness of Plato’s account of 
Love, with the second being related to the first. The first pillar pertains to the deficiencies 
in human beings. People are want for things that they see in others, or at the very least 
that they see as external to themselves and therefore not their own. As such, people aim 
willfully to acquire the object of their desires for themselves. The second pillar, linked 
closely to the first, is that of usefulness. Plato holds that those who love others do so 
because those whom they love are of some use to them – of use in acquiring the very 
things that they simultaneously seek and lack. 
A bit uttered by Socrates in the Lysis is often cited as evidence supporting the first 
of the two pillars. Gregory Vlastos indicates as much when he remarks, “[t]he egoistic 
6 Note that Kosman’s description of Plato’s Love rightly exempts it from the negative connotation that 
often accompanies the word selfish. Selfish means only done for one’s own sake, for whatever good that 
other might provide him or her, and nothing more. 
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perspective of ‘love’ so conceived becomes unmistakable when Socrates, generalizing, 
argues that ‘if one were in want of nothing, one would feel no affection…and he who felt 
no affection would not love.’” (Vlastos 1981, 8) Socrates’ phrase in the Lysis is an 
excellent place to begin the exploration of Plato and his selfish Love because of the 
similarities it shares with something that Socrates says in another dialogue. Socrates’ 
insight in the Lysis mirrors closely what he says in the Symposium regarding the same 
topic. “A thing that desires,” begins Socrates, “desires something of which it is in need; 
otherwise, if it were not in need, it would not desire it.” (Plato, Symposium 1997) It is the 
latter part of what he says in the Symposium that is here relevant. What Socrates says in 
the Lysis and what he says in the Symposium suggest that “want” or “need” – both of 
which could perhaps be founded in lack, which leads subsequently to need or want – is a 
necessary pre-requisite for “affection” and “desire.”7 Clearly Socrates goes one step 
further in the Lysis, suggesting that affection, on top of want, is a necessary pre-requisite 
for Love, but the parallel structure and mere semantic differences between the texts 
allows for an extrapolation: love is the force that helps remedy a weakness – a deficiency 
– in lovers. 
That the weakness is mortality does not fracture his theory, nor does it make Love 
any less selfish. It may be audacious of Plato to consider one of the only veritable 
certainties of life a weakness, but his theory does not suffer for it. The significance of a 
deficit creating the void for which Love is useful in filling is that Love thus becomes a 
means to an end – a selfish end. Love’s purpose is not to help improve the lot of those 
7 Martha Nussbaum mentions in her paper titled The Speech of Alcibiades: a reading of the Symposium, 
that in Aristophanes’ speech what compels individuals to pursue erotic satisfaction is “an unnatural, 
contingent lack…” (Nussbaum 1986) 
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around the lover. Love’s purpose is to help the lover herself secure an existence beyond 
one that the body is capable of. 
What makes the aforementioned dynamic definitively selfish, however, is the fact 
that Love helps remedy the weakness within the wanting lover. Lovers, recognizing 
deficiencies in their partners, have no compulsion to better their counterparts. That is not 
to say that relations rooted in a selfish desire to acquire for oneself something deemed to 
be good cannot result in mutually beneficial relationships, it is only to say that by Plato’s 
standards, Love acts as the catalyst for individual enlightenment only, with counterparty 
benefits being a mere coincidence. 
Consider evidence for the second pillar in the selfish analysis of Plato’s Love, 
again found in the Lysis. “Well, then,” questions Socrates, “are we going to be anyone’s 
friend, or is anyone going to love us as a friend in those areas in which we are good for 
nothing?” (Plato, Lysis 1997, 694) Socrates here is in the process of making clear to 
Lysis that in order to be loved, one must provide some sort of benefit to other. Socrates 
takes on a business-like tone – he is almost corporate in his approach: if someone is not 
productive, they are not worth keeping around. 
 “But if you become wise, my boy, then everybody will be your friend, 
everyone will feel close to you, because you will be useful and good. If 
you don’t become wise, though, nobody will be your friend, not even 
your father or mother or your close relatives.” (Plato, Lysis 1997, 694) 
 
Usefulness, then, according to Socrates, becomes wisdom. Fitting, this is, given his 
account of Diotima’s Love story in the Symposium. Love is only present when someone 
is useful; usefulness is the potential for the acquisition of wisdom; Love is only present 
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when there is potential to become wise. This is in wonderful alignment with Plato’s 
ultimate goal for Love: giving birth in beauty and wisdom. In order to “give birth in 
beauty,” one must acquire wisdom. The acquisition of beauty is best done by loving 
someone wise. As such, Love facilitates becoming wiser, with the ultimate goal being 
creating beautiful, good things and leaving a legacy that outpaces death – a legacy that 
ensures immortality. 8 
At this point we will consider more subtle evidence corroborating the claim that 
Plato’s Love is selfish. It is telling, for example, that Plato maintains even the Gods are 
not exempt from the selfishness of Love. In Aristophanes’ account of Love in the 
Symposium, the Gods use Love to their advantage. After having mounted an offensive 
against the Gods, humans had to be punished. Human worship (an iteration of human 
Love) and the sacrifices humans make (a result of human Love), however, provided the 
Gods with energy and power, and eliminating these sources of energy would be 
detrimental to the Gods’ existence. Humans thus provided the Gods with something that 
they could not do without. “They couldn’t wipe out the human race…as they had the 
giants,” recalls Aristophanes, “because that would wipe out the worship they receive, 
8 It is worth noting here that in light of its telos, Plato’s theory of love may take on a meta-selfish quality. 
One cannot help but notice that the highest aim of Plato’s love is to achieve a level of immortality by virtue 
of wisdom and/or knowledge – both of which Plato has, by all accounts, mastered. This is not to say (at 
least not definitively) that Plato was self-serving in his theory of love, but it is well known that Plato was 
not considered to be a very aesthetically attractive man. Plato’s Love would hold, however, that he – even 
in physical ugliness – might be beautiful. As such, a theory of love that holds virtue, wisdom, and 
knowledge – all of which Plato was extremely well-versed in – above physical beauty can be seen to be 
selfish. Notice that he does not discount physical beauty, for surely he recognized that physical beauty can 
rightly be appreciated, but he maintains that it is a lower realization of love. Plato extols an arena in which 
he excels over one in which he does not, which is to say that if he believes in his own theory and desires 
that others do as well, he himself would be one of the most attractive lovers one could desire to have. 
Putting forth a theory of love in which the creator falls into place conveniently as incredibly attractive may 
be called selfish in the sense that, were his theory to be believed and acted upon, his theory might facilitate 
encounters that promoted Plato’s self-interests. 
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along with the sacrifices we humans give them.” (Plato, Symposium 1997, 473) Here it 
becomes evident that even the Gods, as a third party, use Love to their advantage. 
Humans are split in two and Love is injected into humans so as to keep them from 
mounting a rebellion against the Gods and to ensure the continuation of human worship 
and sacrifice that so empowers them. This selfish employment of Love is but Plato 
making clearer the theme of selfishness that characterizes his Love: even the purest of 
beings, those well-acquainted with the Beauty towards which humans strive – those who 
have achieved the highest goal of Love – use Love to their advantage. If even the Gods – 
devoid of anything that is not good – are selfish with Love, then surely humans would be 
far from reprimanded for doing the same. 
There is also a dynamic that exists between humans and Gods that resembles the 
relationship between lovers, as described by Pausanius. Humans have always been 
subordinates, but Eryximachus says with regards to the relationship between men and 
Gods that, in that realm too, “love is the central concern.” (Plato, Symposium 1997, 472) 
According to Eryximachus, “divination…is the practice that produces loving affection 
between gods and men…” (Plato, Symposium 1997, 472) 
But if the Gods punished humans, what loving dynamic could exist between the 
two? Precisely the loving dynamic that Plato approves of and precisely the dynamic that 
finds itself depicted in Pausanius’ speech. Humans, relegated to the role of subordinate, 
look to the Gods for betterment – to find virtue and live virtuous lives. The Gods, on the 
other hand, provide humans with assistance under the condition that humans continue to 
honor them in the form of sacrifices and piety. 
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Notice that this is exactly the type of Love that Pausanius lauded only two 
speeches before Eryximachus’. Humans play the role of the young lover who subjects 
himself to the will of the Gods because they think it will “make [them] better in wisdom 
or in any other part of virtue…” (Plato, Symposium 1997, 468) And the Gods play the 
role of the older lover who “realizes he is justified in doing anything for a loved one who 
grants him favors…” (Plato, Symposium 1997, 468) Pausanius holds that only when both 
conditions are satisfied is love acceptable. “Then, and only then,” says Pausanius, “when 
these two principles coincide absolutely, is it ever honorable for a young man to accept a 
lover.” (Plato, Symposium 1997, 469) 
Of Plato, Professor Gregory Vlastos says that “a proper study of [Plato’s theory] 
would have to take account of at least three things about its creator: He was a 
homosexual, a mystic, and a moralist.” (Vlastos 1981, 24-25) Given that Plato was a 
mystic who believed strongly in the cosmos, it is only fitting that he would characterize 
the relationship that humans have with the Gods – one of the ancient Greek’s most 
important relationships – as a loving one. 
To conclude, there is yet another instance of selfishness in Love that Plato 
mentions subtly, but importantly. Speaking of Achilles, Plato writes, “they sent him to 
the Isles of the Blest because he dared to stand by his lover Patroclus and avenge him, 
even after he had learned from his mother that he would die if he killed Hector, but that if 
he chose otherwise he’d go home and end his life as an old man.” (Plato, Symposium 
1997, 464) At first glance, Achilles’ death appears honorable and incompatible with the 
selfish form of Love being purported in this essay. And yet, a closer inspection reveals 
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quite the opposite. It appears as though Achilles gave his life so as to avenge his lover, 
Patroclus. It is critical, however, to remember that Achilles was told of his assured death 
were he to kill Hector and avenge Patroclus. He was effectively given the choice: kill 
hector, avenge Patroclus, and die with honor, or live quietly without anyone remembering 
your name. Driven by love for Patroclus, Achilles chose the path of immortality. He 
chose to die, heralded for his bravery, remembered for his honor. In Plato’s eyes, this is 
an instance of Love compelling a man to reach his potential. Love was the reason that 
Achilles created his own story of bravery. By virtue of providing his peers with an 
example of magnificent bravery, honor, and love, Achilles created – gave birth in – 
beauty such that his legacy would remain long after his body had deteriorated. Achilles 
ended his life poetically, beautifully, lovingly, and he was remembered for it. 
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Conclusion 
 Being selfish is often taken to be an undesirable characteristic in people, a 
personality trait that leads one to put oneself before others in a world that is in dire need 
of compassion and benevolence. Selflessness, on the other hand, is far more frequently 
lauded and encouraged than its counterpart. Selflessness is also linked to compassion and, 
loosely, to love. Contemporary ideas about love hold that loving someone is to care for 
them, to value their interests as much as, if not more than, one’s own. But Plato 
disagreed. 
 Plato’s vision of love was one in which self-interest was a central component – 
his love was a selfish one. But the selfish nature of Plato’s love was devoid of the 
distasteful connotation commonly associated with self-interested behavior. Plato’s love 
was a way for individuals to seek betterment. It facilitated the pursuit of wisdom and 
virtue – the most important attributes that a person could have, according to Plato. 
 Thus, love was for Plato simply an incredibly powerful force for good. Put in 
those terms, it now seems as though Plato’s account of love is, in fact, not so different 
from the commonly understood, contemporary view on love. Currently, it is in vogue to 
claim that the route to a better, more equal, less dysfunctional, and altogether happier 
society is an increased sense of compassion for one another – an increase in love for one 
another. But what if the problem is not that people care too little for one another? What if 
the problem is that people care not enough about bettering themselves in the right way? 
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What if too much energy is spent concerning one’s wealth, status, and power, and the 
misuse of energy is deteriorating society? What could possibly remedy that? 
 Plato’s love could remedy that. If people understood that love was the dynamic by 
which they could recognize beauty and become virtuous, wise people, then compassion 
for others would follow as a necessary consequence. By pursuing the good, by acquiring 
wisdom, by bettering themselves, people would behave better in general. It is the premise 
behind the structure of the society in Plato’s Republic. “The idea society of the Republic,” 
says Gregory Vlastos, “is a political community held together by bonds of fraternal 
love…[citizens] are expected to have the same solicitude for the welfare of the polis 
which men ordinarily feel for that of their own family. Those appointed to govern must 
excel not only in intelligence and all-around ability but also in their concern for the 
welfare of the polis, which is said to be a function of their love for it…” (Vlastos, 1981, 
pp. 11-12) 
 So perhaps Plato’s selfish love is not at odds with contemporary ideas about love, 
after all. It may be that in bettering oneself – in becoming a wiser and more virtuous 
person – one shows compassion for others; that caring for oneself enough to seek what is 
good is in fact the gateway to loving others – that true love must be found within oneself 
before it can be shared with others. 
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